The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals recently decided the case of Fields v. Smith. This is the right to hormone treatment for transgendered inmates case. Amazingly Wisconsin, since 2005, has had on the books The Inmate Sex Change Prevention Act codified at Wis. Stat. § 302.386(5m) (2010). This Act, according to the court, essentially prohibited "the Wisconsin Department of Corrections from providing transgender inmates" with certain medical treatments, namely hormones. The court struck down the statute declaring it unconstitutional. Instead of telling you the rationale for why the court decided to strike down the Act now, I'll do that later in the form of an MBE-style multiple choice question.
In the meantime feast on these interesting tidbits gleaned from Fields. First, plaintiffs had been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder ("GID"). The court noted that GID is classified as "a psychiatric disorder in the DSM-IV-TR, the current edition of the American Psychiatric Association's ["APA"] Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders." It really surprised me to learn that GID even exists due to our society's increasingly tolerant attitude toward sexual freedom and expression. Some may remember that the APA originally classified homosexuality as a mental disorder but later removed it from the DSM in 1973. I do not have any expertise in psychiatry but it does not seem like much of a stretch to predict that GID could eventually, due to advances in medicine and technology, the "weight of empirical data", "changing social norms and development of a politically active" transgender community in the U.S. lead the APA, like in the case of homosexuality, to remove GID from the DSM sometime in the future.
Second, the court noted that the "cost of providing hormone therapy is between $300 and $1,000 per inmate per year." The court also noted that "[s]ex reassignment surgery is significantly more expensive, costing approximately $20,000." These are, arguably, important figures to know if you are interested in identifying as a transgendered individual.
Third, at the district court level defendants made an interesting argument that banning hormone treatment to transgender prisoners is key to maintaining prison security. The defendants explained that "[b]ecause hormone therapy alters a person’s secondary sex characteristics such as breast size and body hair...hormones feminize inmates and make them more susceptible to inciting prison violence. But the district court rejected this argument, noting that the evidence showed transgender inmates may be targets for violence even without hormones." The appellate court agreed with the district court.
Now it is time for the Constitutional Law MBE-style multiple choice question based on Fields written by yours truly. I've taken some liberty with the facts but the Fields court's rationale is represented in the correct answer choice. Without checking the opinion for the answer, try your hand at this question. Enjoy:
Prisoner committed voluntary manslaughter and was properly tried and convicted. At sentencing, Prisoner made known to the trial judge that he self-identifies as a transgender individual. The sentencing judge correctly understood Prisoner to mean that he was born with male sexual characteristics but, later in life, had sex reassignment surgery to enable him to perform his “true” feminine identity. The trial judge asked Prisoner whether he had been diagnosed with GID and Prisoner truthfully answered affirmatively. The trial judge sentenced Prisoner to serve 20 years in the male state prison. After serving a week in the male state prison, Prisoner requested hormones as part of his treatment for his diagnosed condition of GID. The state prison denied Prisoner’s request and cited a state statute that banned the prison from distributing hormones to transgendered individuals for medical treatment to justify its action. Prisoner has contacted you, a licensed attorney, told you his story, and seeks your advice. What argument would be most likely to succeed to, on appeal in federal court, overturn the state’s statute?
In the meantime feast on these interesting tidbits gleaned from Fields. First, plaintiffs had been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder ("GID"). The court noted that GID is classified as "a psychiatric disorder in the DSM-IV-TR, the current edition of the American Psychiatric Association's ["APA"] Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders." It really surprised me to learn that GID even exists due to our society's increasingly tolerant attitude toward sexual freedom and expression. Some may remember that the APA originally classified homosexuality as a mental disorder but later removed it from the DSM in 1973. I do not have any expertise in psychiatry but it does not seem like much of a stretch to predict that GID could eventually, due to advances in medicine and technology, the "weight of empirical data", "changing social norms and development of a politically active" transgender community in the U.S. lead the APA, like in the case of homosexuality, to remove GID from the DSM sometime in the future.
Second, the court noted that the "cost of providing hormone therapy is between $300 and $1,000 per inmate per year." The court also noted that "[s]ex reassignment surgery is significantly more expensive, costing approximately $20,000." These are, arguably, important figures to know if you are interested in identifying as a transgendered individual.
Third, at the district court level defendants made an interesting argument that banning hormone treatment to transgender prisoners is key to maintaining prison security. The defendants explained that "[b]ecause hormone therapy alters a person’s secondary sex characteristics such as breast size and body hair...hormones feminize inmates and make them more susceptible to inciting prison violence. But the district court rejected this argument, noting that the evidence showed transgender inmates may be targets for violence even without hormones." The appellate court agreed with the district court.
Now it is time for the Constitutional Law MBE-style multiple choice question based on Fields written by yours truly. I've taken some liberty with the facts but the Fields court's rationale is represented in the correct answer choice. Without checking the opinion for the answer, try your hand at this question. Enjoy:
Prisoner committed voluntary manslaughter and was properly tried and convicted. At sentencing, Prisoner made known to the trial judge that he self-identifies as a transgender individual. The sentencing judge correctly understood Prisoner to mean that he was born with male sexual characteristics but, later in life, had sex reassignment surgery to enable him to perform his “true” feminine identity. The trial judge asked Prisoner whether he had been diagnosed with GID and Prisoner truthfully answered affirmatively. The trial judge sentenced Prisoner to serve 20 years in the male state prison. After serving a week in the male state prison, Prisoner requested hormones as part of his treatment for his diagnosed condition of GID. The state prison denied Prisoner’s request and cited a state statute that banned the prison from distributing hormones to transgendered individuals for medical treatment to justify its action. Prisoner has contacted you, a licensed attorney, told you his story, and seeks your advice. What argument would be most likely to succeed to, on appeal in federal court, overturn the state’s statute?
A) The state statute violates the Life, Liberty and Pursuit of Happiness Clause of the Declaration of Independence.
B) The state statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
C) The state statute violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
D) The state statute violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment
Answer: D. The Fields court held that “[p]rison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment when they display ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 652-53 (7th Cir. 2005). The Fields court was not persuaded by defendants’ argument that hormone therapy was not necessary to treat prisoner’s GID. The Fields court concluded, along with the U.S. Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble, that the U.S. Constitution's ban on "cruel and unusual punishment does not permit a state to deny effective treatment for the serious medical needs of prisoners.” According to the Fields court, since hormone therapy is considered effective treatment for prisoners’ diagnosed GID it cannot be withheld and must be administered by prison officials. Answer B, according to the Field’s court, would have been the second best choice. The Fields court simple decided to prioritize the Eighth Amendment claim over the Fourteenth. Answer choices A and C are distracters and plainly wrong choices.
I'm certainly glad that wasn't a real question on the MBE this year. Or maybe it was, I just completely don't remember and knew I'd get it wrong so I probably moved on. Just from this blog post I can assure you that you have no worries about your bar results. I personally don't feel too good about my performance, but lawyers I've talked to tell me that is a classic feeling for someone who passed. Who knows. Enjoyed reading your intellectual post, though.
ReplyDelete